The battle received its name from the town of Zama, which was five days journey to the west of Carthage.

Bidding their escorts to stay back, the two generals rode out with only an interpreter each to meet between the two forces. This was truly a great occurrence, for as Livy declares these two were “the greatest generals not only of their own times, but of any to be found in the records of the times preceding them, and equal to any of the kings or generals of

any nation whatever.” So close to each other these men would have provided a great contrast. Hannibal was a bearded man of forty-five years who had an active participant in warfare for over twenty seven years. Publius Scipio is depicted in sculpture as completely devoid of hair; at his meeting with Hannibal we was aged thirty four years and a veteran of sixteen years fighting.

The place was just outside the town of Naragara in north Africa. The time was 202 BC. The men were the two greatest generals of their time.

Livy:

He (Scipio) set out into Sicily with thirty ships of war (20 quinquiremes, 10 quadriremes), with about seven

thousand volunteers on board

Polybius 15.3.5-7:

Hannibal at this time was very poorly off for cavalry and sent to a certain Numidian called Tychaeus, who was a relative of Scyphax, and was thought to have the best cavalry in Africa, begging him to help him and join in saving the situation, as he knew well that, if the Carthaginians won, he could retain his principality, but if the Romans were victors, he would risk losing his life too, owing to Massanissa's greed of power. Accordingly, Tychaeus was prevailed on by this appeal and came to Hannibal with a body of two thousand horse.

Polybius 15.5.12:

Next day Massanissa arrived with six thousand foot and four thousand horse. Scipio received him kindly, congratulating him on having brought under his dominion all the former subjects of Scyphax.

Livy: The legions which had fought at Cannae were

the fifth and sixth. After declaring that he would take these with him

into Africa, he inspected them man by man; and leaving those whom he

considered unfit for service, he substituted for them those whom he

had brought from Sicily, filling up those legions so that each might

contain six thousand two hundred infantry and three hundred horse. The

horse and foot of the allies, of the Latin confederacy, he also chose

out of the army of Cannae.

Livy:

There is a wide difference among historians as to the number of

men transported into Africa. In some I find ten thousand infantry and

two hundred horse; in others, sixteen thousand infantry and sixteen

hundred horse. In others, again, I find it stated that thirty-five

thousand infantry and cavalry were put on board the fleet, making the

number more than one half greater. Some have not added an account of

the number; among whom, as the matter is doubtful, I should rather

have myself ranked. Caelius, though he abstains from specifying the

number, increases the impression of their multitude indefinitely. He

says, that birds fell to the ground from the shout of the soldiers,

and that so great a multitude went on board the fleet, that it seemed

as if there was not a man left in Italy or Sicily.

Livy: Masinissa had joined the enemy that very day, with

six thousand infantry and four thousand horse.

There is no way to truly know the number of men under the command of each general on this day. The only clear number which is given by Livy is that Massinissa brought six thousand infantry and four thousand horse to fight at Scipio's side.

Polybius gives the number of Hannibal's mercernary troops as twelve thousand made up of Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders, and Moors. Both Polybius and Livy give the number of elephants as eighty (note: Polybius places this as over eighty) but this number has been questioned by modern historians. Polybius also refers to 2,000 horsemen under Tychaeus which joined Hannibal. He most likely had few other horses (although Polybius does mention that he had Carthaginian horse), as he had killed all the horses he had with him in Italy before making the sea voyage back to Carthaginia. There are no other numbers given by Polybius or Livy.

The only clear detail that can be ascertained from the accounts is that the Romans had a predominance in cavalry due to the arrival of Massinissa.

Gabriel's account estimates the sizes of the forces as follow: Scipio, 36,000 men (12,000 horse), Hannibal, 42,000 men (2,000 horse).

JFC Fuller gives the numbers as 15-20,000 Romans plus 10,000 under Massinissa. He states 2,000 horse for Hannibal but gives no other number.

Delbruck gives the following numbers: 2,000 to 3,000 cavalary for Hannibal and 35,000 Romans (including Massinissa). Delbruck's main source for these numbers was Lehmann.

Addington gives the numbers for both sides as roughly 40,000 men. He notes that 12,000 of Hannibal's were veterans from the Italian campaign. He gives casualties as 20,000 dead Carthaginians.

Most modern accounts agree that each side had a total of 35,000-40,000 troops. The main discrepancy was not in overall numbers but in cavalry and quality of troops. Hannibal only had 2,000-3,000 horse not including the elephants. Scipio had Massinissa's 4,000 cavalry as well as his own contingent of perhaps the same number. The Carthaginian forces were made up of several contingents. The mercenaries were Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders, and Moors. Then there was a levy of Libyans and Carthaginians. Last of all were his core of veterans who had fought with him throughout the Italian campaigns. A legion of Macedonians is also mentioned by Livy.

As the meeting between the two generals had resulted in no peace agreement, both armies prepared for battle.

For the most part Scipio arranged his army in the typical Roman fashion. The hastati in the first rank, principes in the second, and triarii in the third with the cavalry stationed on each flank. The main difference was that rather than placing them in a quincunx formation, he deployed in echelon. This mean that each maniple formed a column with an interval between each rank. His velites were deployed within the gaps between the maniples. The Italian cavalry was placed on the left wing under the command of Gaius Laelius. Upon the right wing was the Numidian cavalry under Massanissa. It is quite likely that Massanissa's infantry was also stationed upon this wing under his command, though neither Livy nor Polybius is clear on this matter and few accounts have troubled to speculate upon this placement.

Figure 1: Quincunx vs. Echelon

Hannibal's forces were deployed in a similar manner to that of the Romans. He also deployed three distinct ranks. The first rank was made up of his mercenary forces, numbering around 12,000. Many of these were light troops such as the Balearic slingers. The second line consisted of African troops (Carthaginians and Libyans) and the legion of Macedonians. After this, Polybius and Livy differ slightly in their accounts of Hannibal's deployment. Polybius reports that the third line was made up from Hannibal's veterans from the Italian campaign while Livy reports that it was made up of the Bruttian Italian natives while the veterans were with the other African troops in the second line. This is a rather significant difference and must be noted. The cavalry were placed on both wings, the Carthaginian upon the right and the Numidian upon the left. His elephants were spread out across the front.

Figure 2: Hannibal's deployment

Polybius 15.9.6-10:

"Scipio drew up his army in the following fashion. In front he placed the hastati with certain intervals between the maniples and behind them the principes, not placing their maniples, as is the usual Roman custom, opposite to the intervals separating those of the first line, but directly behind these latter at a certain distance owing to the large number of the enemy's elephants. Last of all he placed the triarii. On his left wing he posted Gaius Laelius with the Italian horse, and on the right wing Massanissa with the whole of his Numidians. The intervals of the first maniples he filled up with the cohorts of velites, ordering them to open the action, and if they were forced back by the charge of the elephants to retire, those who had time to do so by the straight passages as far as the rear of the whole army, and those who were overtaken to right or left along the intervals between the lines."

Livy:

He then drew up

his troops, posting the hastati in front, the principes behind them,

and closing his rear line with the triarii.

33. He did not draw up his cohorts in close order, but each before

their respective standards; placing the companies at some distance

from each other, so as to leave a space through which the elephants of

the enemy passing might not at all break their ranks. Laelius, whom he

had employed before as lieutenant-general, but this year as quaestor,

by special appointment, according to a decree of the senate, he posted

with the Italian cavalry in the left wing, Masinissa and the Numidians

in the right. The open spaces between the companies of those in the

van he filled with velites, which then formed the Roman light-armed

troops, with an injunction, that on the charge of the elephants they

should either retire behind the files, which extended in a right line,

or, running to the right and left and placing themselves by the side

of those in the van, afford a passage by which the elephants might

rush in between weapons on both sides.

Polybius 15.11.1-3:

" Such was the substance of Scipio's harangue. Hannibal placed in front of his whole force his elephants, of which he had over eighty, and behind them the mercenaries numbering about twelve thousand. They were composed of Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders, and Moors. Behind these he placed the native Libyans and Carthaginians, and last of all the troops he had brought over from Italy at a distance of more than a stade from the front lines. He secured his wings by cavalry, placing the Numidian allies on the left and the Carthaginian horse on the right."

Livy:

Hannibal, in order to terrify

the enemy, drew up his elephants in front, and he had eighty of

them, being more than he had ever had in any battle; behind these his

Ligurian and Gallic auxiliaries, with Balearians and Moors intermixed.

In the second line he placed the Carthaginians, Africans, and a legion

of Macedonians; then, leaving a moderate interval, he formed a reserve

of Italian troops, consisting principally of Bruttians, more of

whom had followed him on his departure from Italy by compulsion and

necessity than by choice. His cavalry also he placed in the wings, the

Carthaginian occupying the right, the Numidian the left.

Polybius 15.12.1-9:

"When all was ready for battle on both sides, the Numidian horse having been skirmishing with each other for some time, Hannibal ordered the drivers of the elephants to charge the enemy. When the trumpets and bugles sounded shrilly from all sides, some of the animals took fright and at once turned tail and rushed back upon the Numidians who had come up to help the Carthaginians, and Massanissa attacking simultaneously, the Carthaginian left wing was soon left exposed. The rest of the elephants falling on the Roman velites in the space between the two main armies, both inflicted and suffered much loss, until finally in their terror some of them escaped through the gaps in the Roman line with Scipio's foresight had provided, so that the Romans suffered no injury, while others fled towards the right and, received by the cavalry with showers of javelins, at length escaped out of the field. It was at this moment that Laelius, availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed the pursuit closely, as likewise did Massanissa. In the meanwhile both phalanxes slowly and in imposing array advanced on each other, except the troops which Hannibal had brought back from Italy, who remained in their original position. When the phalanxes were close to each other, Romans fell upon their foes, raising their war-cry and clashing their shields with their spears as is their practice, while there was a strange confusion of shouts raised by the Carthaginian mercenaries, for, as Homer says, their voice was not one, but

Mixed was the murmur, and confused the sound,

Their names all various,

as appears from the list of them I gave above."

Livy: While the general was thus busily employed

among the Carthaginians, and the captains of the respective nations

among their countrymen, most of them employing interpreters among

troops intermixed with those of different nations, the trumpets and

cornets of the Romans sounded; and such a clamour arose, that the

elephants, especially those in the left wing, turned round upon their

own party, the Moors and Numidians. Masinissa had no difficulty in

increasing the alarm of the terrified enemy, and deprived them of the

aid of their cavalry in that wing. A few, however, of the beasts which

were driven against the enemy, and were not turned back through fear,

made great havoc among the ranks of the velites, though not without

receiving many wounds themselves; for when the velites, retiring to

the companies, had made way for the elephants, that they might not be

trampled down, they discharged their darts at them, exposed as they

were to wounds on both sides, those in the van also keeping up a

continual discharge of javelins; until, driven out of the Roman line

by the weapons which fell upon them from all quarters, these elephants

also put to flight even the cavalry of the Carthaginians posted in

their right wing. Laelius, when he saw the enemy in disorder, struck

additional terror into them in their confusion.

Polybius 15.13.1-10:

"As the whole battle was a hand-to‑hand affair [the men using neither spears nor swords], the mercenaries at first prevailed by their courage and skill, wounding many of the Romans, but the latter still continued to advance, relying on their admirable order and on the superiority of their arms. The rear ranks of the Romans followed close on their comrades, cheering them on, but the Carthaginians behaved like cowards, never coming near their mercenaries nor attempting to back them up, so that finally the barbarians gave way, and thinking that they had evidently been left in the lurch by their own side, fell upon those they encountered in their retreat and began to kill them. This actually compelled many of the Carthaginians to die like men; for as they were being butchered by their own mercenaries they were obliged against their will to fight both against these and against the Romans, and as when at bay they showed frantic and extraordinary courage, they killed a considerable number both of their mercenaries and of the enemy. In this way they even threw the cohorts of the hastati into confusion, but the officers of the principes, seeing what was happening, brought up their ranks to assist, and now the greater number of the Carthaginians and their mercenaries were cut to pieces where they stood, either by themselves or by the hastati. Hannibal did not allow the survivors in their flight to mix with his own men but, ordering the foremost ranks to level their spears against them, prevented them from being received into his force. They were therefore obliged to retreat towards the wings and the open ground beyond."

Livy:

34. The Carthaginian line was deprived of the cavalry on both

sides, when the infantry, who were now not a match for the Romans in

confidence or strength, engaged. In addition to this there was one

circumstance, trifling in itself, but at the same time producing

important consequences in the action. On the part of the Romans the

shout was uniform, and on that account louder and more terrific; while

the voices of the enemy, consisting as they did of many nations of

different languages, were dissonant. The Romans used the stationary

kind of fight, pressing upon the enemy with their own weight and that

of their arms; but on the other side there was more of skirmishing

and rapid movement than force. Accordingly, on the first charge,

the Romans immediately drove back the line of their opponents; then

pushing them with their elbows and the bosses of their shields, and

pressing forward into the places from which they had pushed them,

they advanced a considerable space, as though there had been no one to

resist them, those who formed the rear urging forward those in

front when they perceived the line of the enemy giving way; which

circumstance itself gave great additional force in repelling them. On

the side of the enemy, the second line, consisting of the Africans and

Carthaginians, were so far from supporting the first line when giving

ground, that, on the contrary, they even retired, lest their enemy,

by slaying those who made a firm resistance, should penetrate to

themselves also. Accordingly, the auxiliaries suddenly turned their

backs, and facing about upon their own party, fled, some of them into

the second line, while others slew those who did not receive them into

their ranks, since before they did not support them, and now refused

to receive them. And now there were, in a manner, two contests going

on together, the Carthaginians being compelled to fight at once with

the enemy and with their own party. Not even then, however, did they

receive into their line the terrified and exasperated troops; but,

closing their ranks, drove them out of the scene of action to the

wings and the surrounding plain, lest they should mingle these

soldiers, terrified with defeat and wounds, with that part of their

line which was firm and fresh. But such a heap of men and arms had

filled the space in which the auxiliaries a little while ago had

stood, that it was almost more difficult to pass through it than

through a close line of troops. The spearmen, therefore, who formed

the front line, pursuing the enemy as each could find a way through

the heap of arms and men, and streams of blood, threw into complete

disorder the battalions and companies. The standards also of the

principes had begun to waver when they saw the line before them driven

from their ground. Scipio, perceiving this, promptly ordered the

signal to be given for the spearmen to retreat, and, having taken his

wounded into the rear, brought the principes and triarii to the wings,

in order that the line of spearmen in the centre might be more strong

and secure. Thus a fresh and renewed battle commenced, inasmuch as

they had penetrated to their real antagonists, men equal to them in

the nature of their arms, in their experience in war, in the fame of

their achievements, and the greatness of their hopes and fears. But

the Romans were superior both in numbers and courage, for they had now

routed both the cavalry and the elephants, and having already defeated

the front line, were fighting against the second.

Polybius 15.14.1-9:

"The space which separated the two armies still on the field was now covered with blood, slaughter, and dead bodies, and the Roman general was placed in great difficulty by this obstacle to his completing the rout of the enemy. For he saw that it would be very difficult to pass over the ground without breaking his ranks owing to the quantity of slippery corpses which were still soaked in blood and had fallen in heaps and the number of arms thrown away at haphazard. However, after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy, he stationed the latter in the fore part of the field of battle, opposite the enemy's centre, and making the principes and triarii close up on both wings ordered them to advance over the dead. When these troops had surmounted the obstacles and found themselves in a line with the hastati the two phalanxes closed with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination, and Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper moment. When they fell on Hannibal's army from the rear, most of the men were cut down in their ranks, while of those who took to flight only quite a few escaped, as the cavalry were close on them and the country was level. More than fifteen hundred Romans fell, the Carthaginian loss amounting to twenty thousand killed and nearly the same number of prisoners."

Livy:

35. Laelius and Masinissa, who had pursued the routed cavalry through

a considerable space, returning very opportunely, charged the rear of

the enemy's line. This attack of the cavalry at length routed them.

Many of them, being surrounded, were slain in the field; and many,

dispersed in flight through the open plain around, were slain on

all hands, as the cavalry were in possession of every part. Of the

Carthaginians and their allies, above twenty thousand were slain on

that day; about an equal number were captured, with a hundred and

thirty-three military standards, and eleven elephants. Of the victors

as many as two thousand fell. Hannibal, slipping off during the

confusion, with a few horsemen came to Adrumetum, not quitting the

field till he had tried every expedient both in the battle and before

the engagement; having, according to the admission of Scipio, and

every one skilled in military science, acquired the fame of having

marshalled his troops on that day with singular judgment. He placed

his elephants in the front, in order that their desultory attack, and

insupportable violence, might prevent the Romans from following their

standards, and preserving their ranks, on which they placed their

principal dependence. Then he posted his auxiliaries before the line

of Carthaginians, in order that men who were made up of the refuse of

all nations and who were not bound by honour but by gain, might not

have any retreat open to them in case they fled; at the same time that

the first ardour and impetuosity might be exhausted upon them, and,

if they could render no other service, that the weapons of the enemy

might be blunted in wounding them. Next he placed the Carthaginian

and African soldiers, on whom he placed all his hopes, in order that,

being equal to the enemy in every other respect, they might have the

advantage of them, inasmuch as, being fresh and unimpaired in strength

themselves, they would fight with those who were fatigued and wounded.

The Italians he removed into the rear, separating them also by an

intervening space, as he knew not, with certainty, whether they were

friends or enemies. Hannibal, after performing this as it were his

last work of valour, fled to Adrumetum, whence, having been summoned

to Carthage, he returned thither in the six and thirtieth year after

he had left it when a boy; and confessed in the senate-house that he

was defeated, not only in the battle, but in the war, and that there

was no hope of safety in any thing but in obtaining peace.

Polybius 15.15-16

"Such was the result of the final battle between Scipio and Hannibal, the battle which decided the war in favour of Rome. The action over, Scipio after following up the enemy and plundering their camp returned to his own. Hannibal accompanied by a few horsemen never stopped until he was in safety in Adrumetum. He had done in the battle and before it all that could be done by a good general of long experience. For, in the first place, he had by his conference with Scipio attempted to terminate the dispute by himself alone; showing thus that while conscious of his former successes he mistrusted Fortune and was fully aware of the part that the unexpected plays in war. In the next place, when he offered battle he so managed matters that it was impossible for any commander with the same arms at his disposal to make better dispositions for a contest against the Romans than Hannibal did on that occasion. The order of a Roman force in battle makes it very difficult to break through, for without any change it enables every man individually and in common with his fellows to present a front in any direction, the maniples which are nearest to the danger turning themselves by a single movement to face it. Their arms also give the men both protection and confidence owing to the size of the shield and owing to the sword being strong enough to endure repeated blows. So that for these reasons they are formidable antagonists very difficult to overcome. 16 But nevertheless to meet each of these advantages Hannibal had shown incomparable skill in adopting at the critical moment all such measures as were in his power and could reasonably be expected to succeed. For he had hastily collected that large number of elephants and had placed them in front on the day of battle in order to throw the enemy into confusion and break his ranks. He had placed the mercenaries in advance with the Carthaginians behind them in order that the Romans before the final engagement might be fatigued by their exertions and that their swords might lose their edge owing to the great slaughter, and also in order to compel the Carthaginians thus hemmed in on both sides to stand fast and fight, in the words of Homer

That e'en the unwilling might be forced to fight.

The most efficient and steadiest of his troops he had placed behind at a certain distance in order that, anticipating and witnessing from afar what took place, they might with undiminished strength and spirit make use of their qualities at the proper time. If he, who had never as yet suffered defeat, after taking every possible step to insure victory, yet failed to do so, we must pardon him. For there are times when Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the proverb says, "A brave man meets another braver yet," as we may say happened in the case of Hannibal."

Livy: 36. Immediately after the battle, Scipio, having taken and plundered

the enemy's camp, returned to the sea and his ships, with an immense

booty, news having reached him that Publius Lentulus had arrived at

Utica with fifty men of war, and a hundred transports laden with every

kind of stores. Concluding that he ought to bring before Carthage

every thing which could increase the consternation already existing

there, after sending Laelius to Rome to report his victory, he ordered

Cneius Octavius to conduct the legions thither by land; and, setting

out himself from Utica with the fresh fleet of Lentulus, added to

his former one, made for the harbour of Carthage. When he had arrived

within a short distance, he was met by a Carthaginian ship decked with

fillets and branches of olive. There were ten deputies, the leading

men in the state, sent at the instance of Hannibal to solicit peace;

to whom, when they had come up to the stern of the general's ship,

holding out the badges of suppliants, entreating and imploring the

protection and compassion of Scipio, the only answer given was, that

they must come to Tunes, to which place he would move his camp. After

taking a view of the site of Carthage, not so much for the sake of

acquainting himself with it for any present object, as to dispirit

the enemy, he returned to Utica, having recalled Octavius to the

same place. As they were proceeding thence to Tunes, they received

intelligence that Vermina, the son of Syphax, with a greater number of

horse than foot, was coming to the assistance of the Carthaginians.

A part of his infantry, with all the cavalry, having attacked them on

their march on the first day of the Saturnalia, routed the Numidians

with little opposition; and as every way by which they could escape in

flight was blocked up, for the cavalry surrounded them on all sides,

fifteen thousand men were slain, twelve hundred were taken alive, with

fifteen hundred Numidian horses, and seventy-two military standards.

The prince himself fled from the field with a few attendants during

the confusion. The camp was then pitched near Tunes in the same place

as before, and thirty ambassadors came to Scipio from Carthage. These

behaved in a manner even more calculated to excite compassion than the

former, in proportion as their situation was more pressing; but

from the recollection of their recent perfidy, they were heard with

considerably less pity. In the council, though all were impelled by

just resentment to demolish Carthage, yet, when they reflected upon

the magnitude of the undertaking, and the length of time which would

be consumed in the siege of so well fortified and strong a city,

while Scipio himself was uneasy in consequence of the expectation of

a successor, who would come in for the glory of having terminated the

war, though it was accomplished already by the exertions and danger of

another, the minds of all were inclined to peace.

Livy 35.14:

14. Sulpicius, falling sick, staid at Pergamus. Villius, on hearing

that the king was carrying on war in Pisidia, went on to Ephesus, and,

during a few days that he halted in that city, took pains to procure

frequent interviews with Hannibal, who happened to be there at the

time, in order to sound his intentions, if possible, and to remove

his apprehensions of danger threatening him from the Romans. No other

business, indeed, of any kind was brought forward at these meetings;

yet they accidentally produced an important consequence, as

effectually as if it had been intentionally sought; the lowering

Hannibal in the esteem of the king, and rendering him more obnoxious

to suspicion in every matter. Claudius, following the history written

in Greek by Acilius, says, that Publius Africanus was employed in this

embassy, and that it was he who conversed with Hannibal at Ephesus.

He even relates one of their conversations, in which Scipio asked

Hannibal, "whom he thought the greatest captain?" and that he

answered, "Alexander, king of Macedonia; because, with a small band,

he defeated armies whose numbers were beyond reckoning; and because he

had overrun the remotest regions, the merely visiting of which was a

thing above human aspiration." Scipio then asked, "to whom he gave the

second place?" and he replied, "To Pyrrhus; for he first taught the

method of encamping; and besides, no one ever showed more exquisite

judgment, in choosing his ground, and disposing his posts; while he

also possessed the art of conciliating mankind to himself to such a

degree, that the nations of Italy wished him, though a foreign prince,

to hold the sovereignty among them, rather than the Roman people, who

had so long possessed the dominion of that part of the world." On his

proceeding to ask, "whom he esteemed the third?" Hannibal replied,

"Myself, beyond doubt." On this Scipio laughed, and added, "What would

you have said if you had conquered me?" "Then," replied the other, "I

would have placed Hannibal, not only before Alexander and Pyrrhus,

but before all other commanders." This answer, turned with Punic

dexterity, and conveying an unexpected kind of flattery, was highly

grateful to Scipio, as it set him apart from the crowd of commanders,

as one of incomparable eminence.

If Hannibal was vanquished at Zuma, it was because genius cannot

accomplish the impossible. Zuma proved again the perfect knowledge of

men that Hannibal possessed and his influence over the troops. His

third line, the only one where he really had reliable soldiers, was

the only one that fought. Beset on all sides, it slew two thousand

Romans before it was conquered. - Ardant DuPicq, Battle Studies

2005-08-18T21:39:01